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Abstract
We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters are embedded in a common
metric space, and cardinal preferences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. In
a positional voting rule, each candidate receives a score from each ballot based on the ballot’s
rank order; the candidate with the highest total score wins the election. The cost of a candidate
is his sum of distances to all voters, and the distortion of an election is the ratio between the
cost of the elected candidate and the cost of the optimum candidate. We consider the case when
candidates are representative of the population, in the sense that they are drawn i.i.d. from the
population of the voters, and analyze the expected distortion of positional voting rules.
Our main result is a clean and tight characterization of positional voting rules that have
constant expected distortion (independent of the number of candidates and the metric space).
Our characterization result immediately implies constant expected distortion for Borda Count
and elections in which each voter approves a constant fraction of all candidates. On the other
hand, we obtain super-constant expected distortion for Plurality, Veto, and approving a con-
stant number of candidates. These results contrast with previous results on voting with metric
preferences: When the candidates are chosen adversarially, all of the preceding voting rules
have distortion linear in the number of candidates or voters. Thus, the model of representative
candidates allows us to distinguish voting rules which seem equally bad in the worst case.
1 Introduction
In light of the classic impossibility results for axiomatic approaches to social choice [4] and voting
[18, 28], a fruitful approach has been to treat voting as an implicit optimization problem of finding
the “best” candidate for the population in aggregate [9, 11, 24, 25]. Using this approach, voting
systems can be compared based on how much they distort the outcome, in the sense of leading
to the election of suboptimal candidates. A particularly natural optimization objective is the
sum of distances between voters and the chosen candidate in a suitable metric space [1, 2, 3, 19].
The underlying assumption is that the closer a candidate is to a voter, the more similar their
positions on key questions are. Because proximity implies that the voter would benefit from the
candidate’s election, voters will rank candidates by increasing distance, a model known as single-
peaked preferences [7, 15, 8, 23, 22, 6, 27, 5].
Even in the absence of strategic voting, voting systems can lead to high distortion in this setting,
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because they typically allow only for communication of ordinal preferences1, i.e., rankings of candi-
dates [10]. In a beautiful piece of recent work, Anshelevich et al. [2] showed that this approach can
draw very clear distinctions between voting systems: some voting systems (in particular, Copeland
and related systems) have distortion bounded by a small constant, while most others (including
Plurality, Veto, k-approval, and Borda Count) have unbounded distortion, growing linearly in the
number of voters or candidates.
The examples giving bad distortion typically have the property that the candidates are not
“representative” of the voters. Anshelevich et al. [2] show more positive results when there are
no near-ties for first place in any voter’s ranking. Cheng et al. [12] propose instead a model of
representativeness in which the candidates are drawn randomly from the population of voters;
under this model, they show smaller constant distortion bounds than the worst-case bounds for
majority voting with n = 2 candidates. Cheng et al. [12] left as an open question the analysis of
the distortion of voting systems for n ≥ 3 representative candidates.
In the present work, we study the distortion of positional voting systems with n ≥ 3 representa-
tive candidates. Informally (formal definitions of all concepts are given in Section 2), a positional
voting system is one in which each voter writes down an ordering of candidates, and the system
assigns a score to each candidate based solely on his2 position in the voter’s ordering. The map
from positions to scores is known as the scoring rule of the voting system, and for n candidates is a
function gn : {0, . . . , n− 1} → R≥0. The total score of a candidate is the sum of scores he obtains
from all voters, and the winner is the candidate with maximum total score. The most well-known
explicitly positional voting system is Borda Count [13], in which gn(i) = n− i for all i. Many other
systems are naturally cast in this framework, including Plurality (in which voters give 1 point to
their first choice only) and Veto (in which voters give 1 point to all but their last choice).
In analyzing positional voting systems, we assume that voters are not strategic, i.e., they report
their true ranking of candidates based on proximity in the metric space. This is in keeping with
the line of work on analyzing the distortion of social choice functions, and avoids issues of game-
theoretic modeling and equilibrium existence or selection (see, e.g., [16]) which are not our focus.
As our main contribution, we characterize when a positional voting system is guaranteed to
have constant distortion, regardless of the underlying metric space of voters and candidates, and
regardless of the number n of candidates that are drawn from the voter distribution. The char-
acterization relies almost entirely on the “limit voting system.” By normalizing both the scores
and the candidate index to lie in [0, 1] (we associate the ith out of n candidates with his quantile
i
n−1 ∈ [0, 1]), we can take a suitable limit g of the scoring functions gn as n→∞.
Our main result (Corollary 3.2 in Section 3) states the following: (1) If g is not constant on
the open interval (0, 1), then the voting system has constant distortion. (2) If g is a constant other
than 1 on the open interval (0, 1), then the voting system does not have constant distortion. The
only remaining case is when g ≡ 1 on (0, 1). In that case, the rate of convergence of gn to g matters,
and a precise characterization is given by Theorem 3.1.
As direct applications of our main result, we obtain that Borda Count and k-approval for
k = Θ(n) representative candidates have constant distortion; on the other hand, Plurality, Veto,
the Nauru Dowdall method (see Section 2), and k-approval for k = O(1) have super-constant
1Of course, it is also highly questionable that voters would be able to quantify distances in a metric space
sufficiently accurately, in particular given that the metric space is primarily a modeling tool rather than an actual
concrete object.
2For consistency, we always use male pronouns for candidates and female pronouns for voters.
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distortion. In fact, it is easy to adapt the proof of Theorem 3.1 to show that the distortion of
Plurality, Veto, and O(1)-approval, even with representative candidates, is Ω(n).
Our results provide interesting contrasts to the results of Anshelevich et al. [2]. Under adver-
sarial candidates, all of the above-mentioned voting rules have distortion Ω(n); the focus on repre-
sentative candidates allowed us to distinguish the performance of Borda Count and Θ(n)-approval
from that of the other voting systems. Thus, an analysis in terms of representative candidates
allows us to draw distinctions between voting systems which in a worst-case setting seem to be
equally bad.
As a by-product of the proof of our main theorem, in Lemma 3.3, we show that every voting
system (positional or otherwise) has distortion O(n) with representative candidates. Combined
with the lower bound alluded to above, this exactly pins down the distortion of Plurality, Veto, and
O(1)-approval with representative candidates to Θ(n). For Veto, this result also contrasts with the
worst-case bound of Anshelevich et al. [2], which showed that the distortion can grow unboundedly
even for n = 3 candidates.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Voters, Metric Space, and Preferences
The voters/candidates are embedded in a closed metric space (Ω, d), where dω,ω′ is the distance
between points ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. The distance captures the dissimilarity in opinions between voters (and
candidates) — the closer two voters or candidates are, the more similar they are. The distribution of
voters in Ω is denoted by the (measurable) density function qω. We allow for q to have point masses.
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Unless there is no risk of confusion, we will be careful to distinguish between a location ω ∈ Ω and a
specific voter j or candidate i at that location. We apply d equally to locations/voters/candidates.
We frequently use the standard notion of a ball B(ω, r) := {ω′ | dω,ω′ ≤ r} in a metric space.
For balls (and other sets) B, we write qB :=
∫
ω∈B qωdω.
An election is run between n ≥ 2 candidates according to rules defined in Section 2.3. The n
candidates are assumed to be representative of the population, in the sense that their locations are
drawn i.i.d. from the distribution q of voters.
Each voter ranks the n candidates i by non-decreasing distance from herself in (Ω, d). Ties are
broken arbitrarily, but consistently4, meaning that all voters at the same location have the same
ranking. We denote the ranking of a voter j or a location ω over candidates i by πj(i) or πω(i).
The distance-based ranking assumption means that πω(i) < πω(i
′) implies that dω,i ≤ dω,i′ and
dω,i < dω,i′ implies that πω(i) < πω(i
′). As mentioned in the introduction, we assume that voters
are not strategic; i.e., they express their true ranking of candidates based on proximity in the metric
space.
3Since the continuum model allows for point masses, it subsumes finite sets of voters. Changing all our results to
finite or countable voter sets is merely cosmetic.
4Our results do not depend on specific tie breaking rules.
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2.2 Social Cost and Distortion
Candidates are “better” if they are closer to voters on average. The social cost of a candidate (or
location) i is
ci =
∫
ω
dω,iqωdω.
The socially optimal candidate among the set C of candidates running is denoted by o(C) :=
argmini∈C ci. The overall optimal location is denoted by ô ∈ argminω∈Ω cω, which is any 1-median
of the metric space. (If there are multiple optimal locations, consider one of them fixed arbitrarily.)
The argmin always exists, because the metric space is assumed to be closed, and the cost function is
continuous and bounded below by 0. Note that it is not necessary that there be any voters located
at ô.
Based on the votes, a voting system will determine a winner w(C) for the set C of candidates,
who will often be different from o(C). The distortion measures how much worse the winner is than
the optimum
D(C) =
cw(C)
co(C)
.
We are interested in the expected distortion of positional voting systems under i.i.d. random can-
didates, i.e.,
E
C
i.i.d.
∼ q
[D(C)] .
Our distortion bounds are achieved by lower-bounding co(C) ≥ cô. A particularly useful quantity
in this context is the fraction of voters outside a ball of radius r around ô, which we denote by
H(r) := 1− qB(ô,r). The following lemma captures some useful simple facts that we use:
Lemma 2.1. 1. For any candidate or location i,
ci ≤ cô + di,ô. (1)
2. The cost of any candidate or location i can be written as
ci =
∫ ∞
0
(1− qB(i,r))dr. (2)
3. For all r ≥ 0, the cost of the optimum location ô is lower-bounded by
cô ≥ rH(r). (3)
Proof. 1. The proof of the first inequality simply applies the triangle inequality under the
integral:
ci =
∫
ω
dω,iqωdω ≤
∫
ω
(dω,ô + di,ô)qωdω = cô + di,ô.
2. For the second equation, observe that ci = Eω∼q [di,ω], and the expectation of any non-
negative random variable X can be rewritten as E [X] =
∫∞
0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx.
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3. For the third inequality, we apply the previous part with i = ô, and lower bound∫ ∞
0
Prω∼q[dô,ω ≥ x]dx =
∫ r
0
Prω∼q[dô,ω ≥ x]dx+
∫ ∞
r
Prω∼q[dô,ω ≥ x]dx
≥
∫ r
0
Prω∼q[dô,ω ≥ r]dx+
∫ ∞
r
0 dx
= r ·H(r).
2.3 Positional Voting Systems and Scoring Rules
We are interested in positional voting systems. Such systems are based on scoring rules: voters
give a ranking of candidates, and with each position is associated a score.
Definition 2.1 (Scoring Rule). A scoring rule for n candidates is a non-increasing function gn :
{0, . . . , n− 1} → [0, 1] with gn(0) = 1 and gn(n− 1) = 0.
Definition 2.2 (Positional Voting System). A positional voting system is a sequence of scoring
rules gn, one for each number of candidates n = 1, 2, . . ..
The interpretation of gn is that if voter j puts a candidate i in position πj(i) on her ballot, then
i obtains gn(πj(i)) points from j. The total score of candidate i is then
σ(i) =
∫
ω
gn(πω(i))qωdω.
The winning candidate is one with highest total score, i.e., for a set C of n candidates, w(C) ∈
argmaxi∈C σ(i); again, ties are broken arbitrarily, and our results do not depend on tie breaking.
The restriction to monotone non-increasing scoring rules is standard when studying positional
voting systems. One justification is that in any positional voting system violating this restriction,
truth-telling is a dominated strategy, rendering such a system uninteresting for most practical
purposes. Given this restriction, the assumption that gn(0) = 1 and gn(n − 1) = 0 is without loss
of generality, because a score-based rule is invariant under affine transformations.
Next, we want to capture the notion that a positional voting system is “consistent” as we vary
the number of candidates n. Intuitively, we want to exclude contrived voting systems such as “If
the number of candidates is even, then use Borda Count; otherwise use Plurality voting.” This is
captured by the following definition.
Definition 2.3 (Consistency). Let V be a positional voting system with scoring rules {gn | n ∈ N}.
We say that V is consistent if there exists a function g : Q ∩ [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that for each
rational quantile x ∈ [0, 1] and accuracy parameter ǫ > 0, there exists a threshold n0 such that
gn(⌊x(n − 1)⌋) ≥ g(x)− ǫ and gn(⌈x(n − 1)⌉) ≤ g(x)+ ǫ for all n ≥ n0. We call g the limit scoring
rule of V.
Intuitively, this definition says that the sequence of scoring rules gn is consistent with a single
scoring rule g in the limit. Using the fact that gn is monotone non-increasing for each n, it can
be shown that g is also monotone non-increasing. We note that gn converges pointwise to g in a
precise and natural sense. Formally, when x ∈ [0, 1] is rational, there exists an infinite sequence of
integers n with ⌊x(n − 1)⌋ = ⌈x(n− 1)⌉ = x(n − 1), and consistency implies that g(x) must equal
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the limit of gn(x(n − 1)) for that sequence of values of n. Therefore the limit scoring rule g is
uniquely defined if it exists.
All positional voting systems we are aware of are consistent according to Definition 2.3.
Example 2.1. To illustrate the notion of a consistent positional voting system, consider the fol-
lowing examples, encompassing most well-known scoring rules.
• In Plurality voting with n candidates, gn(0) = 1 and gn(k) = 0 for all k > 0. The limit
scoring rule is g(0) = 1 and g(x) = 0 for all x > 0.
• In Veto voting with n candidates, gn(k) = 1 for all k < n − 1 and gn(n − 1) = 0. The limit
scoring rule is g(x) = 1 for all x < 1 and g(1) = 0.
• In k-approval voting with constant k, we have gn(k
′) = 1 for k′ ≤ min(k − 1, n − 1), and
gn(k
′) = 0 for all other k′. The limit scoring rule is g(0) = 1 and g(x) = 0 for all x > 0,
i.e., the same as for Plurality voting. (This relies on k being constant, or more generally,
k = o(n).)
• In k-approval voting with linear k, there exists a constant γ ∈ (0, 1) with gn(k) = 1 for all
k ≤ γn, and gn(k) = 0 for all larger k. The limit scoring rule is g(x) = 1 for x ≤ γ and
g(x) = 0 for x > γ.
• The Borda voting rule has gn(k) = 1 −
k
n−1 (after normalization). The limit scoring rule is
g(x) = 1− x.
• The Dowdall method used in Nauru [17, 26] has gn(k) = 1/(k + 1). After normalization, the
rule becomes gn(k) =
1
n−1 · (
n
k+1 − 1). The limit scoring rule is g(0) = 1 and g(x) = 0 for all
x > 0, i.e., the same as for Plurality voting. This is because for every constant quantile x,
the score of the candidate at x is 1n−1
(
1
x − 1
) n→∞
→ 0.
3 The Main Characterization Result
In this section, we state and prove our main theorem, characterizing positional voting systems with
constant distortion.
Theorem 3.1. Let V be a positional voting system with a sequence gn of scoring rules for n =
1, 2, . . .. Then, V has constant expected distortion if and only if there exist constants n0 and y ∈
(0, 1) such that for all n ≥ n0,
y ·
⌈y(n−1)⌉−1∑
k=0
(gn(k)− gn(⌈y(n − 1)⌉)) > (1− y) ·
n−1∑
k=n−⌈y(n−1)⌉
(1− gn(k)) . (4)
We prove Theorem 3.1 in Sections 3.1 (sufficiency) and 3.2 (necessity). Condition (4) is quite
unwieldy. In most cases of practical interest, we can use Corollary 3.2.
Corollary 3.2. Let V be a consistent positional voting system with limit scoring rule g.
1. If g is not constant on the open interval (0, 1), then V has constant expected distortion.
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2. If g is equal to a constant other than 1 on the open interval (0, 1), then V does not have
constant expected distortion.
Corollary 3.2 is proved in Section 4.
The constant in Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 depends on V, but not on the metric space
or the number of candidates. Corollary 3.2 has the advantage of determining constant expected
distortion only based on the limit scoring rule g. The only case when it does not apply is when
g(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1). In that case, the higher complexity of Theorem 3.1 is indeed necessary to
determine whether V has constant distortion. Fortunately, Veto voting is the only rule of practical
importance for which g(x) ≡ 1 on [0, 1), and it is easily analyzed.
Before presenting the proofs, we apply the characterization to the positional voting systems from
Example 2.1. Using the limit scoring rules derived in Example 2.1, Corollary 3.2 implies constant
expected distortion for Borda Count and k-approval with linear k = Θ(n), and super-constant
expected distortion for Plurality, k-approval with k = o(n), and the Dowdall method.
This leaves Veto voting, for which it is easy to apply Theorem 3.1 directly. Because gn(k) = 1
for all k < n − 1, for any constant y < 1 and large enough n, the left-hand side of (4) is 0, while
the right-hand side is positive. Hence, (4) can never be satisfied for sufficiently large n, implying
super-constant expected distortion. The proof easily generalizes to show that when voters can veto
o(n) candidates, the distortion is super-constant.
3.1 Sufficiency
In this section, we prove that condition (4) suffices for constant distortion. First, because of the
monotonicity of gn, if (4) holds for y ∈ (0, 1), then it also holds for all y
′ ∈ [y, 1). Now, the high-
level idea of the proof is the following: we define a radius r̂ large enough so that the ball B(ô, r̂)
around the socially optimal location ô contains a very large (but still constant) fraction y of all
voters, such that y satisfies (4). If the number of candidates n is large enough (a large constant),
standard Chernoff bounds ensure that as r ≥ r̂ grows large, most candidates who are running will
be from inside B(ô, r). In turn, if many candidates inside B(ô, r) are running, all candidates outside
B(ô, 3r) are very far down on almost everyone’s ballot, and therefore cannot win. In particular,
Inequality (4) implies that the total score of an average candidate in B(ô, r) exceeds the maximum
possible total score of a candidate outside B(ô, 3r). This allows us to bound the expected distortion
in terms of the cost of ô.
The case of small n is much easier, since we can treat n as a constant. In that case, the following
lemma is sufficient.
Lemma 3.3. If n candidates are drawn i.i.d. at random from q, the expected distortion is at most
n+ 1.
Proof. The proof illustrates some of the key ideas that will be used later in the more technical
proof for a large number of candidates. We want to bound
EC
[
cw(C)
] (1)
≤ cô + EC
[
dô,w(C)
]
= cô +
∫ ∞
0
PrC [dô,w(C) ≥ r]dr.
In order for a candidate at distance at least r from ô to win, it is necessary that at least one
such candidate be running. By a union bound over the n candidates, the probability of this event
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is at most PrC [dô,w(C) ≥ r] ≤ nH(r), so
EC
[
cw(C)
]
≤ cô + n
∫ ∞
0
H(r)dr
(2)
= (n+ 1)cô.
Lower-bounding the cost of the optimum candidate from C in terms of the overall best location
ô, the expected distortion is
EC
[
cw(C)
co(C)
]
≤ EC
[
cw(C)
cô
]
=
1
cô
EC
[
cw(C)
]
≤
1
cô
· (n+ 1)cô = n+ 1.
In preparation for the case of large n, we begin with the following technical lemma, which shows
that whenever (4) holds, it will also hold when the terms on the left-hand side are “shifted,” and
the right-hand side can be increased by a factor of 2 (or, for that matter, any constant factor).
Lemma 3.4. Assume that there exist y ∈ (0, 1) and n0 such that (4) holds. Then, there exists
z0 ∈ (
1
2 , 1) such that for all n ≥ n0, all z ≥ z0, and all integers 0 ≤ m ≤ (1− z) · n,
z ·
⌈z·(n−1)⌉−1∑
k=0
(gn(m+ k)− gn(m+ ⌈z · (n− 1)⌉)) > 2(1− z) ·
n−1∑
k=n−⌈z·(n−1)⌉
(1− gn(k)) . (5)
We now flesh out the details of the construction. By Lemma 3.4, there exists z0 ∈ (
1
2 , 1) and
n0 such that (5) holds for all z ≥ z0, all n ≥ n0, and all integers 0 ≤ m ≤ (1− z) ·n. For simplicity
of notation, write z := z0, and let µ := (1−
1
e ) +
1
e · z ∈ (z, 1) and n̂ := max(n0,
1
1−z ). Notice that
µ, z, n̂ only depend on V, but not on the metric space or number of voters.
Let r̂ := inf{r | qB(ô,r) ≥ µ}, so that qB(ô,r̂) ≥ µ, and q{ω|dô,ω≥r̂} ≥ 1 − µ. (Both inequalities
hold with equality unless there is a discrete point mass at distance r̂ from ô.)
Consider any r ≥ r̂ and write T := B(ô, 3r) and S := B(ô, r), as depicted in Figure 1. When n
candidates are drawn i.i.d. from q, the expected fraction of candidates drawn from outside of S is
exactly H(r) ≤ 1− µ. Let Er be the event that more than (1− z)n candidates are from outside S.
Lemma 3.5 uses Chernoff bounds and the definitions of the parameters to show that Er happens
with sufficiently small probability; Lemma 3.6 then shows that unless Er happens, the distortion is
constant.
Lemma 3.5. Pr[Er] ≤
e
1−z ·H(r).
Proof. By the Chernoff bound Pr[Z > (1+ δ)E [Z]] <
(
eδ
(1+δ)1+δ
)E[Z]
, applied with E [Z] = H(r) ·n
and δ = 1−zH(r) − 1 > 0, the probability of Er is at most
Pr[Er] ≤
 e 1−zH(r)−1
( 1−zH(r))
1−z
H(r)
H(r)·n = (e1−z−H(r)
( 1−zH(r) )
1−z
)n
≤
(
e ·H(r)
1− z
)(1−z)·n
.
Recall that µ := (1 − 1e ) +
1
e · z ∈ (z, 1). Because r ≥ r̂, we have that H(r) ≤ 1 − µ =
1−z
e ; in
particular, e·H(r)1−z ≤ 1, so the probability can be upper-bounded by making the exponent (1− z) · n
as small as possible. Because n ≥ n̂ ≥ 11−z , the exponent is lower-bounded by 1. Thus, we obtain
that the probability of Er is at most
e
1−z ·H(r).
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iô
r
S T
Figure 1: T = B(ô, 3r) and S = B(ô, r). Most of the voters are in S. Lemma 3.6 states that
whenever most of the candidates are from T , the winner must come from T . The reason is that for
any i /∈ T , even an average candidate in S beats i; in particular, the best candidate from S must
beat i.
Lemma 3.6. Whenever Er does not happen, the winner of the election is from B(ô, 3r).
Proof. Let Z := ⌈z · (n− 1)⌉. Assume that exactly s ≥ Z out of the n candidates are drawn
from S. Consider a candidate i /∈ T . We will compare the average number of points of candidates
in S with the maximum possible number of points of candidate i, and show that the former exceeds
the latter.
• Each voter j /∈ S gives at most one point to i. On the other hand, even if j ranks all of S in the
last s positions, the total number of points assigned by j to S is at least
∑n−1
k=n−s gn(k). The
difference between the number of votes to i and the average number of votes to candidates in
S is thus at most
1−
(
1
s
·
n−1∑
k=n−s
gn(k)
)
=
1
s
·
n−1∑
k=n−s
(1− gn(k)).
Because no more than a 1−µ fraction of voters are strictly outside S, the total advantage of
i over an average candidate in S resulting from such voters is at most
∆i :=
1
s
· (1− µ) ·
n−1∑
k=n−s
(1− gn(k)).
• Each voter j ∈ S will rank all candidates in S (who are at distance at most 2r from her)
ahead of all candidates outside T (who are at distance strictly more than 3r − r = 2r from
her).
Let m ≥ 0 be such that j ranks i in position s +m. Then, i gets gn(s +m) points from j.
Because j ranks all of S ahead of i, she gives at least
∑s−1
k=0 gn(k +m) points in total to S.
Hence, the difference in the number of points that j gives to an average candidate in S and
the number of votes that j gives to i is at least
(1
s
·
s−1∑
k=0
gn(k +m)
)
− gn(s+m) =
1
s
·
s−1∑
k=0
(gn(k +m)− gn(s+m)) .
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Because at least a µ fraction of voters are in S, the total advantage of an average candidate
in S resulting from voters in B is at least
∆S :=
1
s
· µ ·
s−1∑
k=0
(gn(k +m)− gn(s+m)) .
We show that ∆S > ∆i, using condition (5). Because gn is monotone non-increasing, and
because s ≥ Z, we get that
s−1∑
k=0
(gn(k +m)− gn(s+m)) ≥
Z−1∑
k=0
(gn(k +m)− gn(Z +m))
(5)
>
2(1− z)
z
·
n−1∑
k=n−Z
(1− gn(k)) .
Because z > 12 and gn is monotone, we get that
∑n−1
k=n−Z(1 − gn(k)) ≥
1
2
∑n−1
k=n−s(1 − gn(k)).
Hence,
∆S >
1
s
· µ ·
1− z
z
·
n−1∑
k=n−s
(1− gn(k))
µ≥z
≥
1
s
· (1− µ) ·
n−1∑
k=n−s
(1− gn(k)) = ∆i.
We now wrap up the sufficiency portion of the proof of Theorem 3.1. We distinguish two cases,
based on the number of candidates n. If n < n̂, then Lemma 3.3 implies an upper bound of
n + 1 ≤ n̂ ≤ max(n0,
1
1−z ) = O(1) on the expected distortion. Now assume that n ≥ n̂. Recall
that r̂ := inf{r | qB(ô,r) ≥ y}. By Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, for any r ≥ r̂, the probability that the
election’s winner is outside B(ô, 3r) is at most e1−z ·H(r). The rest of the proof is similar to that
of Lemma 3.3. We again use that
EC
[
cw(C)
]
≤ cô +
∫ ∞
0
PrC [dô,w(C) ≥ r]dr,
and bound∫ ∞
0
PrC [dô,w(C) ≥ r]dr =
∫ 3r̂
0
PrC [dô,w(C) ≥ r]dr +
∫ ∞
3r̂
PrC [dô,w(C) ≥ r]dr
Lemmas 3.5, 3.6
≤
∫ 3r̂
0
1 dr +
∫ ∞
3r̂
e
1− z
·H(r)dr
≤ 3r̂ +
e
1− z
·
∫ ∞
0
H(r)dr
(2)
= 3r̂ +
e
1− z
· cô.
To upper-bound r̂, recall that at least a 1−µ fraction of voters are outside of B(ô, r̂) or on the
boundary. Therefore, by Inequality (3), cô ≥ r̂ · (1−µ). Substituting this bound, the expected cost
of the winning candidate is at most(
1 +
3
1− µ
+
e
1− z
)
· cô =
(
1 +
4
1− µ
)
· cô = O(cô),
as y depends only on the voting system V, but not on the metric space or the number of candidates.
This completes the proof of sufficiency.
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3.1.1 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Because condition (4) holds for all y′ > y, we may assume that y ≥ 12 .
Define z0 :=
5
6 +
y
6 , and consider any z ≥ z0. Fix n ≥ n0, and write Y := ⌈y(n− 1)⌉ and
Z := ⌈z(n − 1)⌉. Let m ≤ (1− z)(n − 1) be arbitrary. We define
S1 :=
n−1∑
k=0
(1− gn(k)) ,
S2 :=
m−1∑
k=0
(gn(k)− gn(Y )) ,
S3 :=
Y−1∑
k=m
(gn(k)− gn(Y )) .
By monotonicity of gn,
Z−1∑
k=0
(gn(m+ k)− gn(m+ Z)) ≥ S3;
furthermore,
∑n−1
k=n−Z (1− gn(k)) ≤ S1. Therefore, it suffices to show that S1 ≤
z
2(1−z)S3. By
condition (4) and monotonicity of gn, and because y ≥
1
2 ,
S2 + S3 =
Y−1∑
k=0
(gn(k)− gn(Y )) ≥
1− y
y
n−1∑
k=n−Y
(1− gn(k)) ≥
1− y
2y
S1.
To upper-bound S1 in terms of S3, we show that the contribution of S2 to the preceding sum
is small, and upper-bound S2 in terms of S1 + S3. Because S2 ≤ (1− z)(n− 1) · (1− gn(Y )), using
the monotonicity of gn, we can write
S1 + S3 =
Y−1∑
k=0
(1− gn(k)) + S3 +
n−1∑
k=Y
(1− gn(k))
≥
Y−1∑
k=m
(1− gn(Y )) +
n−1∑
k=Y
(1− gn(Y ))
= (n−m) · (1− gn(Y ))
≥ z · (n− 1) · (1− gn(Y ))
≥
z
1− z
· S2.
Combining the preceding inequalities, we now obtain that
1− y
2y
· S1 ≤
1− z
z
(S1 + S3) + S3 =
1
z
· S3 +
1− z
z
· S1.
Solving for S1, and using that the definition of z0 ensures 1− z ≤
1−y
6 , we now bound
S1 ≤
2y
z(1 − y)− 2y(1− z)
· S3 ≤
2y
4(1 − z)
· S3 ≤
z
2(1− z)
· S3,
completing the proof.
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3.2 Necessity
Next, we prove that the condition in Theorem 3.1 is also necessary for constant distortion. We
assume that the condition (4) does not hold, i.e., for every y ∈ (0, 1) and n0, there exists an n ≥ n0
such that
y ·
⌈y·(n−1)⌉−1∑
k=0
(gn(k)− gn(⌈y · (n− 1)⌉)) ≤ (1− y) ·
n−1∑
k=n−⌈y·(n−1)⌉
(1− gn(k)) . (6)
We will show that the distortion of V is not bounded by any constant.
The high-level idea of the construction is as follows: we define two tightly knit clusters A and
B that are far away from each other. A contains a large α fraction of the population, and thus
should in an optimal solution be the one that the winner is chosen from. We will ensure that with
probability at least 12 , the winner instead comes from B. Because B is far from A, most of the
population then is far from the chosen candidate, giving much worse cost than optimal.
The metrics underlying A and B are as follows: B will essentially provide an “ordering,”
meaning that whichever set of candidates is drawn from B, all voters in B (and essentially all in
A) agree on their ordering of the candidates. This will ensure that one candidate from B will get
a sufficiently large fraction of first-place votes, and will be ranked highly enough by voters from A,
too. A will be based on a large number M of discrete locations ω. Their pairwise distances are
chosen i.i.d.: as a result, the rankings of voters are uniformly random, and there is no consensus
among voters in A on which of their candidates they prefer. Because the vote is thus split, the best
candidate from B will win instead.
The following parameters (whose values are chosen with foresight) will be used to define the
metric space.
• Let c > 1 be any constant; we will construct a metric space and number of candidates for
which the distortion is at least c.
• Let β ∈ (0, 12) solve the quadratic equation
2β+1
3β · (1− β) = 2c− 1. A solution exists because
at β = 12 , the left-hand side is
2
3 < 2c − 1; it goes to infinity as β → 0, while the right-hand
side is a positive constant. β is the fraction of voters in the small cluster B.
• Let α = 1− β denote the fraction of voters in the large cluster A.
• Let s = 1+ββ be the distance between the clusters B and A. (Each cluster will have diameter
at most 2.)
• Let α̂ ≥ 12 +
α
2 > α satisfy 4α̂ · (1− α̂) < α · (1−α); such an α̂ exists because the left-hand side
goes to 0 as α̂ → 1. α̂ < 1 is a high-probability upper bound on the fraction of candidates
that will be drawn from A.
• Let n0 =
4
β2
> 16; this is a lower bound on the number of candidates that ensures that the
actual fraction of candidates drawn from A is at most α̂ with sufficiently high probability.
• Let n ≥ n0 be the n whose existence is guaranteed by the assumption (6) (for y = α̂ and n0).
• Let M = n3; this is the number of discrete locations ω we construct within the larger cluster
A.
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We now formally define the metric space consisting of two clusters:
Definition 3.1. The metric space consists of two clusters A and B. A has M discrete locations,
and q has a point mass of αM on each such location. The total probability mass on B is qB = 1−α,
distributed uniformly over the interval [1, 2]. Locations in B are identified by x ∈ [1, 2]. The
distances are defined as follows:
1. For each distinct pair ω, ω′ ∈ A, the distance dω,ω′ is drawn independently uniformly at
random from [1, 2].
2. For each distinct pair x, x′ ∈ B of locations, the distance is defined to be dx,x′ := min(x, x
′).
3. Partition B = [1, 2] into M ! disjoint intervals Iπ of length 1/M ! each, one for each permu-
tation of the M locations in A. For ω ∈ A and x ∈ Iπ, let π
−1(ω) be the position of ω in π,
and define the distance between ω and x to be dω,x = s+
x
4 +
π−1(ω)
M ! .
Proposition 3.7. Definition 3.1 defines a metric.
Proof. Non-negativity, symmetry, and indiscernibles hold by definition. Because all distances within
clusters are in [1, 2], and distances across clusters are more than 2, the triangle inequality holds for
all pairs ω, ω′ ∈ A and all pairs x, x′ ∈ B.
Because dω,x ∈ [s, s + 1] for all ω ∈ A and x ∈ B, and distances within A or B are at least 1,
there can be no shorter path than the direct one between any ω ∈ A and x ∈ B. Therefore, the
triangle inequality is satisfied.
Now consider a (random) set C of n candidates, drawn i.i.d. from q. We are interested in the
event that the resulting slate of candidates is highly representative of the voters, in the following
sense.
Definition 3.2. Let C be the (random) set of n candidates drawn from q. Let E be defined as the
conjunction of the following:
1. For each location ω ∈ A, the set C contains at most one candidate from ω.
2. At least a β2 fraction of candidates in C is drawn from B (and thus at most an α̂ fraction of
candidates are from A).
3. At least an α2 fraction of candidates in C is drawn from A.
4. No pair x, x′ ∈ B ∩ C has |x− x′| < 1(M−1)! .
Lemma 3.8 uses standard tail bounds to show that E happens with probability at least 12 ; then,
Lemma 3.9 shows that whenever E happens, the winner is from B.
Lemma 3.8. E happens with probability at least 12 .
Proof. We upper-bound the probability of the complement of each of the four constituent sub-
events.
1. For each of the at most n2 pairs of candidates, the probability that they are both drawn from
the same location is at most α/M ≤ 1/n3. By a union bound over all pairs, the probability
that any location has at least two pairs is at most 1/n.
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2. Let the random variable X be the number of candidates drawn from B. Then, E [X] = β · n,
and X is a sum of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables. By the Hoeffding bound Pr[X < (β −
ǫ)n] ≤ exp(−2ǫ2n), with ǫ = β/2, we obtain that the fraction of candidates from B is too
small with probability at most exp(−β
2
2 · n) ≤ exp(
−β2
2 · n0) =
1
e2
.
3. The proof is essentially identical to the previous case (except because α ≥ β, the bounds are
even stronger), so this event happens with probability at least 1
e2
as well.
4. Consider all intervals of [1, 2] of length 2(M−1)! , starting at 1+
k
(M−1)! for some k = 0, 1, . . . , (M−
1)! − 2. If x, x′ with |x− x′| ≤ 1(M−1)! existed, they would both be contained in at least one
such interval (because the interval length is twice as long as the distance).
For any of the (M−1)!−1 intervals I, the probability that a specific pair of candidates is drawn
from I is at most 4((M−1)!)2 . By a union bound over all (at most n
2) pairs of candidates and
all intervals, the probability that any pair is drawn from any interval I is at most 4n
2
(M−1)! ≤
1
n .
Because n ≥ 9, a union bound shows that E happens with probability at least 12 .
Lemma 3.9. Whenever E happens, the winning candidate is from B.
Proof. Let b be the actual number of candidates drawn from B, and a = n − b the number of
candidates drawn from A. Because we assumed that E happened, b ≥ β2 · n and a ≤ α̂ · n. Let CA
be the set of candidates drawn from A. Under E , CA contains at most one candidate from each
location ω ∈ A. As a result, because the random distances within A are distinct with probability
1, there will be no ties in the rankings of any voters.
Let ı̂ be the candidate from B with smallest value x̂. With probability 1, the x value of ı̂ is
unique. Consider some arbitrary candidate i ∈ CA from location ω
′. We calculate the contributions
to ı̂ and i from voters in B and in A separately, and show that ı̂ beats i. Because this holds for
arbitrary i, the candidate ı̂ or another candidate from B wins.
1. We begin with points given out by voters in B. By definition of the distances within B, ı̂ is
ranked first by all voters in B.
Voters in Iπ rank the candidates from A according to their order in π. For each ordering
of CA, exactly a
1
a! fraction of permutations induces that ordering. In particular, for each
k ∈ 1, . . . , a, exactly a 1/a fraction of voters places i in position k+ b. Thus, i obtains a total
of (1 − α) ·
∑n−1
k=n−a
1
a · gn(k) points from voters in B. Overall, ı̂ obtains an advantage of at
least
∆B = (1− α) ·
(
gn(0)−
1
a
·
n−1∑
k=n−a
gn(k)
)
= (1− α) ·
1
a
·
n−1∑
k=n−a
(1− gn(k)).
2. Next, we analyze the number of points given out by voters in A. The distance from any voter
location ω ∈ A to ı̂ is at most s+ x̂4 +
n
M ! . Under E , no other candidate from B can be at a
location x ≤ x̂ + 1(M−1)! ; therefore, the distance from any voter location ω ∈ A to any other
candidate x ∈ B is at least
dω,x ≥ s+
x
4
≥ s+
x̂
4
+
1
4(M − 1)!
> s+
x̂
4
+
n
M !
≥ dω,̂ı,
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so all voters in A prefer ı̂ over any other candidate from B. Hence, ı̂ obtains at least α · gn(a)
points combined from voters in A.
To analyze the votes from voters in A for candidates from A, we first notice that E and the
draw of candidates are independent of the distances within A. Hence, even conditioned on
E , the distances dω,ω′ between locations in A are i.i.d. uniform from [1, 2]. In particular, each
location ω ∈ A ranks the candidates in CA in uniformly random order. Furthermore, for two
locations ω 6= ω′, the rankings of CA are independent; the reason is that they are based on
disjoint vectors of distances (dω,i)i∈CA , (dω′,i)i∈CA . We use this independence to apply tail
bounds. Let ω′ be the location of i. Voters rank i as follows:
• Among locations ω without a candidate of their own, in expectation, a 1/a fraction of
voters will rank i in position k, for each k = 0, . . . , a− 1.
• Among the a − 1 locations ω 6= ω′ with a candidate of their own, in expectation, a
1/(a − 1) fraction of voters will rank i in position k, for each k = 1, . . . , a− 1.
• Voters at ω′ will rank i in position 0.
For each k, let the random variable Xk be the number of locations that rank i in position
k. By the preceding arguments, E [Xk] =
M
a , and Xk is a sum of M independent (not i.i.d.)
Bernoulli random variables. Hence, by the Hoeffding bound, the probability that more than
a 2a fraction of voters rank i in position k is at most 2 exp(−2 ·
1
a2
·M) ≤ 2 exp(−n). By a
union bound over all candidates i ∈ CA and all values k = 0, . . . , a− 1, with high probability,
for all i and k, the fraction of voters (in A) ranking i in position k is at most α · 2a . Because
the total fraction of voters in A is α, any excess votes for some (early) positions k must
be compensated by fewer votes for other (late) positions k′. Relaxing the constraint that
the number of votes for each position k must be non-negative, we can upper-bound the total
points for i by assuming that each of the positions k = 0, . . . , a−2 receives twice the expected
number of votes, while position k = a−1 receives a negative number of votes that compensates
for the excess votes. Then, the advantage for i over ı̂ from votes from A is at most
∆A := α ·
(
a−2∑
k=0
2
a
· gn(k) +
2− a
a
· gn(a− 1)− gn(a)
)
=
α
a
·
( a−2∑
k=0
(
2gn(k)− gn(a− 1)− gn(a)
)
+ gn(a− 1)− gn(a)
)
gn monotone
≤
2α
a
·
a−1∑
k=0
(gn(k) − gn(a)).
Finally, we can bound
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∆A · a ≤ 2α ·
a−1∑
k=0
(gn(k)− gn(a))
α≤α̂, gn mon.
≤ 2α̂ ·
⌈α̂(n−1)⌉−1∑
k=0
(gn(k)− gn(⌈α̂(n− 1)⌉))
(6), Def. of n
≤ 2(1− α̂) ·
n−1∑
k=n−⌈α̂(n−1)⌉
(1− gn(k))
gn mon.
≤ 2(1− α̂) ·
α̂ · (n− 1)
a
n−1∑
k=n−a
(1− gn(k))
a≥α·n/2
≤ 2(1− α̂) ·
2α̂
α
n−1∑
k=n−a
(1− gn(k))
Def. of α̂
< (1− α) ·
n−1∑
k=n−a
(1− gn(k))
= ∆B · a.
Thus, ı̂ beats all candidates drawn from A, and the winner will be from B.
Using the preceding lemmas, the proof of necessity is almost complete. Consider the metric
space with all the parameters as defined above. By Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9, with probability at least
1
2 , the winner is from B. The social cost of any candidate from B is at least β · 0+ (1− β) · (s+1).
On the other hand, the social cost of any candidate from A is at most (1− β) · 2 + β · (s+ 1) = 3.
The distortion in this case is thus at least
(1− β) · (s+ 1)
3
=
(2β + 1) · (1− β)
3β
= 2c− 1.
In the other case (when E does not occur — this happens with probability at most 12), the distortion
is at least 1, so that the expected distortion is at least 12(2c − 1) +
1
2 · 1 = c.
4 Proof of Corollary 3.2
Proof of Corollary 3.2. For the first part of the corollary, assume that g is not constant on
(0, 1). The intuition is that in that case, the sum on the left-hand side of (4) (for sufficiently
large y) will be Ω(n), while the sum on the right-hand side is obviously at most n. By making
y a constant close enough to 1, we can dominate the constant from Ω, and thus ensure that the
inequality (4) holds. Then, the constant distortion follows from Theorem 3.1.
More precisely, let 0 < ℓ < u < 1 be such that g(ℓ) > g(u). Let δ := g(ℓ) − g(u) and
y := max(u, 1 − δℓ8 ) ∈ (0, 1). Let n0 be such that for all n ≥ n0, we have
gn(⌊ℓ · (n− 1)⌋) ≥ g(ℓ)− δ/4, gn(⌈u · (n− 1)⌉) ≤ g(u) + δ/4,
⌊ℓ · (n− 1)⌋ ≥
ℓn
2
, ⌈y · (n− 1)⌉ ≤ 2yn.
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Such an n0 exists by the consistency of V and basic integer arithmetic. Then, for all n ≥ n0,
y ·
⌈y·(n−1)⌉−1∑
k=0
(gn(k)− gn(⌈y · (n− 1)⌉))
≥ y ·
⌊ℓ·(n−1)⌋−1∑
k=0
(gn(⌊ℓ · (n− 1)⌋)− gn(⌈u · (n− 1)⌉))
≥ y ·
⌊ℓ·(n−1)⌋−1∑
k=0
(δ/2)
≥
1
4
· y · ℓ · n · δ
≥ 2y · (1− y) · n
> (1− y) ·
n−1∑
k=n−⌈y·(n−1)⌉
(1− gn(k)) .
Because the condition (4) is satisfied, Theorem 3.1 implies constant distortion.
For the second part of the corollary, assume that g(x) = c < 1 for all x ∈ (0, 1). Let y ∈ (0, 1)
be arbitrary. We will show that for sufficiently large n, the condition (4) is violated.
The intuition is that the sum on the right-hand side of (4) consists of terms that will in the
limit be 1− c > 0, while the left-hand side is a sum in which each term converges to 0. Thus, never
mind how large the constant y < 1 is, the factors of y and 1 − y will eventually not be enough to
make the left-hand side larger than the right-hand side. Making this intuition precise requires some
care: while the functions gn converge to g, we did not assume that they do so uniformly. To deal
with this issue, we will consider consistency with g at two points γ and 1− γ only (with γ being a
very small constant), and use monotonicity of each gn to bound the remaining terms. The terms of
the sum corresponding to points to the left of γ and to the right of 1− γ can then not be bounded,
but there are few enough of them that we still obtain the desired inequality. More specifically, let
γ ∈ (0, 1) be a sufficiently small constant such that γ < min(y, 1− y) and
δ :=
(1− y) · (1− c)− γ
1 + 3y − 4γ
> 0.
Such a γ exists, since both the numerator and denominator tend to strictly positive numbers
as γ → 0. Recall that g(x) = c for all x ∈ (0, 1). Let n0 be such that for all n ≥ n0,
gn(⌊γ · (n− 1)⌋) ≤ gn(⌈
γ
2
· (n− 1)⌉) ≤ c+ δ,
gn(⌈(1 − γ)(n− 1)⌉) ≥ gn(⌊(1 −
γ
2
)(n − 1)⌋) ≥ c− δ,
⌈y · (n− 1)⌉ − ⌊γ · (n− 1)⌋ ≤ 2(y − γ)(n− 1).
Such an n0 exists by basic integer arithmetic and the consistency of V applied at x = γ/2 and
x = 1− γ/2.
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Writing Γ = ⌊γ(n− 1)⌋ and Γ′ = ⌈(1− γ)(n − 1)⌉, we get
y ·
⌈y·(n−1)⌉−1∑
k=0
(gn(k) − gn(⌈y · (n− 1)⌉)) ≤ y ·
Γ−1∑
k=0
1 +
⌈y·(n−1)⌉−1∑
k=Γ
(
gn(Γ)− gn(Γ
′)
)
≤ y · (γ · (n− 1) + 2 · (y − γ) · (n− 1) · 2δ)
= y · (n− 1) · (γ + (y − γ) · 4δ) .
The first inequality uses y < 1− γ and the monotonicity of gn, and the second inequality uses
the bounds obtained from consistency of gn with respect to g. To bound the right-hand side of (4),
(1− y) ·
n−1∑
k=n−⌈y·(n−1)⌉
(1− gn(k)) ≥ (1− y) ·
n−1∑
k=n−⌈y·(n−1)⌉
(1− gn(Γ))
≥ (1− y) · y · (n− 1) · (1− c− δ).
The first inequality again used monotonicity of gn, and the second used the bounds obtained
from the consistency of gn with respect to g. Canceling the common term y(n − 1) between the
left-hand side and right-hand side, the right-hand side of (4) is at least as large as the left-hand
side whenever (1− y) · (1− c− δ) ≥ γ + (y − γ) · 4δ. Solving for δ, this is equivalent to
δ ≤
(1− y) · (1− c)− γ
1 + 3y − 4γ
,
which is exactly ensured by our choice of γ and δ. This completes the proof.
5 Conclusions
When candidates are drawn i.i.d. from the voter distribution, we showed that whether a positional
voting system V has expected constant distortion can be almost fully characterized by its limiting
behavior. In particular, if the limiting scoring rule is not constant on (0, 1), then V has constant
expected distortion; if the limiting scoring rule is a constant other than 1 on (0, 1), then V has super-
constant expected distortion. A more subtle condition depending on the “rate of convergence” to
the limit rule completes the characterization.
Our Theorem 3.1 currently does not characterize the order of growth of the distortion. With
some effort, the proof could likely be adapted to the case where the y in the theorem is a function
y(n), which would allow us to characterize the rate at which the distortion grows with n.
For specific voting systems, the proof of Theorem 3.1 can often be adapted to give tighter
bounds. For example, straightforward modifications of the proof can be used to show that the
distortion of k-approval or k-veto (where each voter can veto k candidates) for constant k grow as
Ω(n). This matches the O(n) upper bound from Lemma 3.3, giving a tight analysis of the distortion
of these voting systems. Similarly, the sufficiency proof can be adapted to show that the distortion
of Borda Count is at most 16, for all metric spaces and all n. When the number of candidates
grows large enough, the expected distortion is in fact bounded by 10.
Our results indicate that if one is concerned about systematic, and possibly adversarial, bias
in which candidates run for office, randomizing the slate of candidates may be part of a solution
approach. Such an approach can be considered as a step in the direction of lottocracy and sortition
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[14, 20, 21], in which office holders are directly chosen at random from the population. Pure
lottocracy does well in terms of representativeness of office holders, but one of its main drawbacks
is the potential lack of competency. As a broader direction for future research, our work here
suggests devising models that capture the tension between these two objectives, and would allow
for the design of hybrid mechanisms that navigate the tradeoff successfully.
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